In the current international security landscape, one can observe a phenomenon that deserves careful and dispassionate analysis. The pressure exerted by Donald Trump on NATO allies—particularly regarding defense spending and strategic responsibility—has, in the short term, led several member states to reassess their own security obligations. One visible consequence has been a renewed European attention to strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for global energy flows.

This development has attracted criticism. Some argue that such pressure undermines the so-called “postwar international order.” Yet this criticism often rests on an insufficiently examined premise: that the existing order is both neutral and self-sustaining. A closer look at the historical evolution of that order suggests otherwise.

The Structure of the Postwar Order: Power Before Norms

The “postwar international order” is frequently described in normative terms—as a rules-based system grounded in cooperation, multilateralism, and shared values. However, historically, its stability has depended less on abstract norms than on concrete distributions of power.

During the Cold War, the system was effectively bipolar, structured by the strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. After 1991, this system transitioned into a predominantly unipolar order centered on the United States. In this configuration, the United States assumed a disproportionate role in maintaining global security, including safeguarding maritime trade routes, stabilizing energy flows, and underwriting alliance structures.

For example, the U.S. Navy has long been the primary guarantor of freedom of navigation in critical waterways such as the Persian Gulf. According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz. While the United States itself has become less dependent on Middle Eastern energy due to domestic production (especially after the shale revolution), many of its allies—particularly in Europe and Asia—remain structurally dependent on these routes.

This asymmetry is central. The United States has provided a global public good—maritime security—at a cost that is not proportionally shared.

Public Choice and the Logic of Free-Riding

From the perspective of public choice theory, this arrangement generates predictable incentive problems. When a public good is provided—especially one as large and diffuse as global security—actors have incentives to free ride. That is, they benefit from the good without contributing proportionally to its provision.

This dynamic has been well documented within NATO. Despite a formal guideline that member states should spend at least 2% of GDP on defense, many European countries consistently fell below this threshold for decades. As 2025, all NATO member states met the 2% target, however, only three meet the new goal of 3.5%. These countries are Poland (4.48%), Lithuania (4%) and Latvia (3.73%).

This is not a moral failure; it is an institutional one. When incentives allow actors to externalize costs, such behavior becomes rational.

The analogy sometimes used—though admittedly blunt—is that of dependency. When an actor becomes accustomed to external provision, any attempt to rebalance responsibilities may provoke resistance. This reaction is not surprising. It reflects an adjustment to altered incentives rather than a sudden change in values.

Policy Style Versus Policy Substance

Criticism of Trump’s approach often focuses on style: direct, confrontational, at times diplomatically unconventional. This characterization is not inaccurate. However, it risks obscuring a more important question: whether the substance of the policy differs fundamentally from that of previous administrations.

In fact, successive U.S. administrations—Republican and Democratic alike—have repeatedly called on European allies to increase defense spending. For instance, both the Obama and Bush administrations raised concerns about burden-sharing within NATO. What distinguishes the Trump period is less the content of the message than the method of delivery and the willingness to attach explicit consequences to non-compliance.

From an institutional perspective, this can be interpreted as a shift from persuasion to incentive enforcement. When repeated diplomatic signaling fails to produce behavioral change, actors may resort to more direct mechanisms. This is not necessarily a departure from the system; it may be an attempt to correct its internal imbalances.

International Institutions and the Question of Effectiveness

A related issue concerns the role of international organizations. The United States has historically been the principal financial and political supporter of institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the World Health Organization. These institutions were designed to reduce transaction costs, facilitate cooperation, and manage global externalities.

However, their effectiveness has increasingly been questioned. In areas such as conflict resolution, trade dispute enforcement, and global health coordination, outcomes have often fallen short of expectations. For example, WTO dispute settlement mechanisms have faced paralysis, and the WHO’s response to global health crises has been subject to significant debate.

From a domestic political standpoint, this raises a straightforward question: if taxpayers fund these institutions, what measurable returns do they receive? When perceived benefits diverge from costs, political support weakens. This dynamic helps explain shifts in U.S. policy preferences, particularly among voters skeptical of multilateral commitments that appear to lack reciprocity.

Energy Security and Strategic Rebalancing

The renewed European attention to maritime security—especially in regions such as the Strait of Hormuz—illustrates how incentives shape behavior. When external guarantees become less certain, actors are compelled to reassess their own vulnerabilities.

This does not necessarily imply a breakdown of the international order. Rather, it may signal a transition toward a more distributed system of responsibility. In such a system, security provision is less centralized and more aligned with actual dependence.

From an economic perspective, this resembles a re-pricing of a previously underpriced public good. When the cost of security becomes more visible, consumption patterns—and contributions—adjust accordingly.

Reinterpreting “Disruption” as Institutional Adjustment

It is therefore insufficient to interpret recent developments solely through the lens of disruption or norm erosion. While changes in policy style may appear abrupt, they often reflect deeper structural adjustments.

In recent years, similar reassessments have occurred not only in Europe but also in parts of Latin America, where long-standing policy frameworks have come under scrutiny. These shifts suggest a broader pattern: a reconsideration of institutional arrangements that were once taken for granted.

The key analytical point is that international orders are not static. They evolve in response to changes in power, incentives, and expectations. What appears as instability may, in some cases, be a process of recalibration.

Conclusion: Beyond Rhetoric, Toward Institutional Analysis

In analyzing international politics, it is tempting to focus on rhetoric—on tone, style, and diplomatic language. Yet such an approach risks missing the underlying dynamics.

The more relevant question is whether policy actions contribute to a more sustainable alignment between costs and responsibilities. If they do, then even unconventional methods may have stabilizing effects in the long run.

The current moment should therefore be understood not as a simple deviation from the postwar order, but as a test of its underlying assumptions. If that order is to endure, it must rest not only on shared values, but also on coherent incentives.

And incentives, unlike rhetoric, cannot be ignored indefinitely.

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Copyright Notice: This article is the intellectual property of its author. If you wish to reproduce or share it, you must clearly indicate the original source and provide proper attribution. Unauthorized copying or distribution without acknowledgment is strictly prohibited. The author has authorized the Global Analysis Lab at Universidad Europea to publish the article on March 23, 2026.

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How to Cite this Article (APA 7th edition)

Wang, H. H. (2026, March 28). Incentives, Burden-Sharing, and the Reconfiguration of the International Security Order. [Blog post]. William Hongsong Wang. https://williamhongsongwang.com/2026/03/28/incentives-burden-sharing-and-the-reconfiguration-of-the-international-security-order